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1-. International relations (IR) theory has suffered a restructuring among 
several lines over the past two decades. The gradual but uninterrupted decline 
of systemic theories - primus inter pares in the discipline since the 1970s- is one 
of those. (1) This decline was accompanied by a rise of those approaches that 
privilege domestic politics as the place to look for answers. For reasons I will 
develop below, such an intellectual step was logical, expected, 
and partially appropriate. (2) While the current state of affairs should not be 
seen as immutable and a systemic comeback is plausible, the truth is that 
domestic politics, and non-systemic approaches in general, are well entrenched 
in a semi-hegemonic position. In this essay I will explain the reasons behind the 
aforementioned shift, assess its consequences, and advance some hypotheses on 
the future of systemic theories of IR. 
 
2-. Born between the interwar period and the dawn the Cold War world, IR was 
created with the explicit objective of explaining the causes of war –particularly 
great wars, understood under the lenses of the two devastating conflicts of the 
first half of the 20th century. Since then, IR scholars have struggled to respond 
to the main challenges –or what they perceive as the main challenges- in world 
politics. (3) This “duty” to explain the world drives theory to follow the patterns 
of change in international politics, which, as they develop, suggest 
new problématiques and novel ways to approach them. In important ways then 
–although, as discussed later, this is not the whole picture- (4) a sociology of 
inquiry is needed to better understand some of the key transformations in IR 
theory -e.g. the shift from systemic to domestic theories.  
 
Systemic approaches (5) made their meteoric rise under the shelter of K. Waltz’s 
Neorealism. (6)   They were created as a tool for a particular time with particular 
problems. (7) This was a world in which the primary preoccupation was how to 
manage the bilateral relationship between the United States and the USSR so 
that it would not en up in World War III. There were certainly other interests in 
the discipline, but this one outweighed all the rest. A Cold War context made 
systemic theories very appropriate. Needless to say, the bipolar conflict had 
been in place a long time before Waltz’s path-breaking Theory of International 
Politics. (8) The essential point is, however, that Neorealism proved to be very 
successful in explaining the basic patterns of interest in this particular period of 
the history of IR –i.e. dynamics of polarity, relevance of nuclear weapons, 
consequences of anarchy and its relationship with war and cooperation, inter 
alia- in a more parsimonious and convincing way than the discipline had ever 
been able to do. 
 
The IR community recognized this “Copernican turn”, as Waltz defined it, as 
progress and systemic approaches were established as mainstream, maybe even 
as “normal science.” Anyone trying to explain something in international 
politics had to reckon with the system. This was true for realists (see the work of 
Gilpin, Walt, and Grieco) but also for scholars with a line of inquiry that differed 
substantially from Waltz’s (see Keohane’s Cooperation after Hegemony for a 
good example).  
 
3-. A dramatic event that shakes the bases of an academic discipline is 
sometimes needed to motivate scholars to devise new lines of inquiry and 
surpass research programs that appear to be losing heuristic power. This is what 
the fall of the Soviet Union did with Neorealism, and systemic approaches in 
general. (9)  
 
Structural realism was in many ways, and problematically so, a theory for the 
Cold War. Its discussion on nuclear weapons, bipolarity, uncertainty, and 
superpower dynamics seemed to be too tied to a specific historical context. (10) 
The inability of neorealism, or any other systemic theory for that matter, to 
foresee –or even explain- the disappearance of the bipolar world –a systemic 
change par excellence-supposed a hard blow to its appeal. (11) Both the fall of 
the USSR and the subsequent appearance (or uncovering, once the Cold War 
veil was lifted) of new “themes” in international politics -IPE, civil wars, the role 
of leaders, the democratic peace, inter alia- opened a fertile camp over which to 
argue for the need to “go beyond systemic theory.” (12)    
 
I argued supra that this was an appropriate move (or partially appropriate). But 
the reasons implicitly inferred up to know -failure in predicting events and a 
crisis in the IR community (in a Kuhnian sense)- cannot support this claim. The 
other face of the coin is that the thorough self-examination of the 1990s also 
responded to internal problems of systemic theories as research programs. For 
example, in the 1980s the discipline was stuck in the mud of absolute vs. relative 
gains debate, a degenerative discussion from a Lakatosian perspective. 
(13)  Visible problems of heuristic power were calling for a partial move beyond 
the system. This was the real cause for the shift, and the best argument to 
characterize it as “appropriate”. The exogenous shock (fall of the USSR) had the 
role, not at all minor, of opening a window of opportunity for dissenting 
scholars.  
 
Helen Milner was one of the most eloquent advocates for this turn. Her 
argument, in short, was that “systemic theory simply cannot take us far enough” 
(Milner, 1992). The assumption that anarchy was the principal variable defining 
states preferences and the primacy of a straight causal line from the system to 
the state and then to policy-making was excessively simplistic, Milner argued. 
How could the discipline solve this quagmire? By studying domestic politics to 
understand states’ preferences and, consequently, the differing patterns of 
conflict and cooperation in international politics. (14) As Milner contended: 
“…cooperation may be unattainable because of domestic intransigence, and not 
because of the international system.” (15)  
 
A reaction against systemic theories was not exclusive to the liberal trenches. 
Following this turn toward domestic politics, some realist scholars directed their 
efforts at the incorporation of domestic variables as a way to add complexity to 
systemic models that they saw as too crude. In his From Wealth to Power, F. 
Zakaria argued that anarchy and the distribution of power were not enough to 
explain the behavior of rising powers. After observing that at the end of the 19th 
century the US was not as assertive as a structural approach would have 
predicted, he hypothesized that this was because it did not have the 
governmental capacity to do so. To solve this puzzle he argued for the 
incorporation of models of resource extraction and governmental capability to 
try to get through the Neorealist corset. This was an important intra-realist 
challenge to a somewhat ossified systemic realism. (16) 
 
The rise of domestic approaches represented a generalized discontentment with 
the excessive importance given to parsimony and the inflexibility that came with 
it. Parsimony, which should be no more than a tool in theory building, was 
placed as a goal in itself, restricting research in a way that went against the 
discipline’s own progress. Those boundaries had to be overcome if we wanted to 
say something about some of the important issues left unstudied by a focus on 
the system. Once again, the Cold War world with its apparently clear strategic 
problems may have seemed more propitious to a highly parsimonious approach 
to theory building. In a post Cold War world, the costs of parsimony were too 
heavy. Domestic theories certainly lost in parsimony, but they gained in a more 
real approach to IR problématiques. This was the primary rationale behind the 
turn here discussed, and in this limited sense, the shift was appropriate. (17) 
 
4-. It would be nice to unambiguously assert that the fall of systemic theories 
made IR a coherent and progressive discipline. This, unfortunately, is not the 
case. The past two decades have seen the formation of a different ethos of theory 
building and discipline development that may end up doing more harm than 
good to our broader understanding of international politics.  
 
Something not mentioned up to now is the ascent of quantitative and strategic-
choice approaches in the discipline. Quantitative approaches gained 
prominence by the same time that, and related to, domestic theories were 
supplanting systemic theories. (18) Strategic choice and game theory, following 
developments in other academic areas -especially economics-, also gained 
importance in the 1990s under the idea of formalizing theories and going 
beyond the “isms.” There is nothing wrong with these approaches per se. 
Quantitative work has been very important in the empirical development of IR -
maybe too neglected in the past. Formal theory, on the other hand, is a powerful 
and clear tool to build and evaluate theories while avoiding problems of 
underspecification all too common in the discipline –though, this is only true if 
one can get through its assumptions. (19) 
 
The problems of this new “methodological bets” are to be found in the costs for 
the general development of the discipline. The most pressing are the ones 
related to the idea that theory construction should be a bottom to top affair, and 
the implicit notion that by building the parts individually we will eventually end 
up in a progressive accumulation of theoretical knowledge. However, this 
epistemological decision may well result in the proliferation of particularistic 
theories of problems ever more sophisticatedly studied, increasingly particular 
and micro, and in crescendo uninteresting. (20) By depending on a kind of 
magical automatic accumulation of theoretical knowledge we are risking to end 
up with an even more chaotic and incoherent discipline (more on this in the 
conclusion).  
 
5-. As said in the introduction, the fall of grace of systemic theories cannot be 
taken as an irreversible given; it is possible to devise some scenarios in which 
systemic approaches could make a comeback. 
 
The first one is linked to the relationship between theory and History discussed 
earlier. The post Cold War world, particularly the 1990s, was a strange period 
for the discipline. The study of IR has historically dealt with great power politics 
as its core. The “curious” 1990s came with a certain absence of great power 
politics, especially due to the overwhelming power position of the US. This goes 
a long way in explaining the growing emphasis on domestic politics, civil wars, 
international organizations, inter alia, during those years. A partial return of 
classical great power politics (or the perception of it) -for example under the 
banner of the rise of China and some other middle powers- might motivate a 
recasting of systemic theories -particularly for those wanting to study polarity 
(a passé topic in the unipolar 1990s), (21) systemic change and its 
consequences, etc. (22) 
 
Another plausible scenario would be the success of some of the ongoing projects 
to make systemic theories more sophisticated and comprehensive by, for 
example, incorporating domestic variables. A good example is “Neo-classical 
Realism” (see fn. 16). This research project proceeds from a systemic 
assumption of the influences of the system (that is, a neorealist basis) but 
incorporates domestic politics as an intervening variable between systemic 
pressures and decision-making. Though a rather interesting proto-school, 
Neoclassical Realism is still in its infant stages and has yet to produce work of 
remarkable characteristics.  
 
Lastly, domestic politics, as should have been expected, were not the panacea 
for the development of IR theory. There might well be a social exhaustion with 
the results of domestic and micro-theory –a Kuhnian crisis analogous to the one 
that discredited systemic theories. This may eventually take IR on unexpected 
paths.  
 
Nevertheless, if measured by academic output and Geist, predicting a comeback 
of systemic approaches seems a risky bet. The discipline appears to be quite 
comfortable with increasing its empirical production, formalizing theories 
towards an Icarian “scientism”, and avoiding, at its own peril, a “wholist” view 
of international politics.  
 
6-. Going beyond systemic theories –not in the sense of vanishing them, but of 
relaxing some of their strictures, increasing their sophistication, and trying new 
approaches- was the necessary thing to do for a methodology that was unable to 
cope with many of the relevant problems in IR. The turn to domestic and 
particularistic perspectives brought much needed renovation, indeed. However, 
the excesses incurred by systemic theorists as a result of an obsession with 
parsimony and structural effects may now seem analogous (although for the 
opposite reasons) to a fixation with the particular and micro-level studies in 
contemporary IR theory. A blind push to obtain ever more data of increasingly 
micro phenomena puts at risk what we can say about international relations in 
general. We may, for example, be more much prepared to sophisticatedly 
answer why a specific insurgent group responded in a specific way to the level of 
aggression of a specific state, (23) but we may also be losing our interest and 
capacity to think about the nature of conflict in its most elemental condition. 
The stakes are too high for the IR community to avoid an honest discussion on 
how far we are willing to continue on this path.  
 
(1) This essay works with the assumption of a relative decline of systemic 
apporaches. To argue that they have vanished would be utterly incorrect. For a 
convincing argument on the inevitability of structural constraints see 
Jervis’sSystem Effects. 
(2) Although a change may be welcomed, the results are not always as 
encouraging as expected (more on this qualification of “appropriate” later). 
(3) This does not mean, of course, that there is an exclusive focus on policy or 
immediacy, It means that in its most basic essence, the idea of the discipline is 
to be able to provide some answers to the pressing problems in the international 
system. To give an example, few people would be interested in studying the 
prospects of war between France and Germany in the 21st century per se –
though it surely is studied as a historical case that can shed light on other 
issues-, while this was one of the main topics in the nascent IR discipline. 
(4) Social science does not progress only by exogenous shocks, but also for 
endogenous reasons that cannot be explained by what happens outside 
theoretical disscusions. 
(5) Understood simply as those that privilege the influence of the structure over 
the behavior of the units. 
(6) This type of theories certainly were not born with Waltz; systemic is a much 
broader category than Neorealism. The important point is that Waltz devised 
the more convincing type of systemic theory. For simplicity, Waltz’ Neorelism 
will be used here as the epitome and a kind of proxy for systemic theory.  
(7) It must be said that the rise of systemic theories also responded to changes 
in the social sciences in general; for example, the influence of structuralist 
anthorpoligist Levi-Strauss’ work, which Waltz knew well. 
(8) Theories of IR before Waltz hosted a diverse group of analysts: Classical 
realism from the hand of a Hans Morgenthau, Geroge Kennan and Raymond 
Aron; liberal approaches from a Stanley Hoffman, Robert Keohane and Joseph 
Nye; Bureacratic Organization and foreign policy from a Graham Allison; and a 
long et cetera. 
(9) See R. N. Lebow, “The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War and the Failure 
of Realism.” 
(10) See I. Oren’s Our Enemies and US: America´s Rivalries and the Making of 
Political Science. 
(11) As with its rise the decline of systemic theories was also linked to broader 
transformations in the world of ideas, to which IR seems to always be a 
latecomer. From a broad perspective, this phenomenon had started in the 1960s 
with the work of Foucault, Derrida, Geertz and others. 
(12) The end of the immediate preoccupation with bipolarity also gave the 
opportunity to rethink some long-term historical problems of Neorealism (see 
Schroeder 1994). 
(13) Some of the scholars engaged in this deabate were: Keohane, Grieco, 
Axelrod, and Mastanduno; cf. Milner (1992). 
(14) In another article in International Organization (1987) she argues that to 
understand the way in which states make decisions in the international 
economy it is not enough to look at anarchy. Her model studies the type of 
economic links between countries (high or low interdependence) and the 
influence of interests groups that may pressure the state to make particular 
decisions; these policy outcomes would have been incomprehensible from a 
systemic/anarchic stance. According to Milner, there is an important dynamic 
of preference construction and strategies adopted that are to be found in 
domestic politics. 
(15) See also Putnam (1988) for an interesting effort to move beyond lists of 
domestic factors and towards a coherent two level theory. 
(16) This line of research has been given the title of Neoclassical Realism (see G. 
Rose 1998). See the work of R. Schweller, J. Taliaferro, A. Friedberg, and T. 
Christensen. 
(17) Systemic theories were also attached to what has been discussed as the 
“paradigm wars” between realism, liberalism, constructivism, etc. The turn 
away from them can also be given credit for helping to discredit this 
unproductive way of theorizing. 
(18) This trend was tied to the notoriety of the “democratic peace” project that 
was, and still is, an empirical enterprise at its core. See Russett and Oneal 
(1999); cf. Gartzke (2007). 
(19) See Wagner, War and the State, and Lake and Powell Strategic Choice and 
International Relations. 
(20) This is not the nature of all the work in this approach, of course, but just a 
possible trend of the school as a whole. See Walt’s “Rigor or Rigor Mortis” for a 
sharp, but not always convincing, critique. 
(21) For an exception see the work by N. Monteiro on unipolarity. This does not 
mean that polarity disappeared from the IR map, but it was certainly shrinked 
as a research question. 
(22) Some young scholars on this line of research are: P. MacDonald, J. Parent, 
D. Kliman and M. Beckley. 
(23) See Jason Lyall’s “Does Indiscriminate Violence Incite Insurgent Attacks? 
Evidence from Chechnya” To be fair, Lyall’s work attempts to generalize from 
this specific case –how convincing he is not very clear, however. 
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